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Abstract. The use of constructionism by climate change deniers and ‘9-11 truthers’ to support ‘post-fact’ 
arguments in recent political and social debates has created controversy within science studies. Here, I seek to 
re-evaluate what constructionists actually say about facts in science. Through revisiting Gaston Bachelard – 
a key influence on scientific constructionism – I argue that science can penetrate to the ‘noumenal core’ of the 
phenomena it studies because it constructs them. This, however, need not imply that facts can be whatever 
we want them to be.
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The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘post-truth’ 
in terms of the dominance of ‘appeals to emo-
tion and personal belief ’ over ‘objective facts’ 
(cited in Fuller 2016; 2) [my emphasis]. This 
distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘belief ’ has been 
central to certain positions within the history 
and philosophy of science, for example in Imre 
Lakatos’s concept of ‘rational reconstruction’ 
and Karl Mannheim’s distinction between 
‘immanent laws’ and ‘extra-theoretical factors’, 
where only the latter fell in the domain of the 
sociology of knowledge, whereas the former 
have a privileged epistemological status (Bar-
nes and Bloor 1982; 26). Famously, for Barry 
Barnes and David Bloor ‘all beliefs are on a par 
with one another with respect to the causes of 
their credibility’ – credibility must therefore 
be explained without regard for truth or falsity 
(ibid.; 23). This ‘Symmetry Principle’ means, in 
other words, that we cannot separate ‘objective 
facts’ from ‘appeals to emotion and personal 
belief ’. What counts as a reason for a belief in 
one context, may support the opposite belief 
in another. In terms of scientific explanation, 
this implies the underdetermination of theory 
by evidence, which may support a number of 
competing explanations (Sokal 1999; 66).1 All 
beliefs, including those regarded by scientists 
as facts, can and should be explained in purely 
social terms, such as generational processes of 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15388/SocMintVei.2017.1.10869
1  Of course, Alan Sokal goes on to argue that concepts such as ‘underdetermination’ and ‘theory-
laden-ness of observation’ have been misapplied by radical relativists (Sokal 1999; x).
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knowledge transmission, formal and informal 
sanctions applied to positive and negative 
judgements, and processes of socialisation and 
social control (Barnes and Bloor 1982; 23).2 
So explanations for the origin, acceptance and 
rejection of knowledge claims ‘are sought in 
the domain of the Social World rather than the 
Natural World’ for all forms of knowledge – 
there is ‘nothing epistemologically special 
about scientific knowledge’ (Pinch and Bijker 
1984; 401).3
A decade before ‘post-truth’ and ‘post-fact’ 
were in common use, Bruno Latour expressed 
concern that conspiracy theorists and the ene-
mies of science had appropriated many of the 
arguments of ‘social constructionism’ – that 
there is no unmediated access to truth, we 
always speak from a particular standpoint, and 
that ‘facts are made up’ (Latour 2004; 230). 
Accounts of the ‘lack of scientific certainty inher- 
ent in the construction of facts’, produced by 
Latour and others, were providing US Republi-
cans with a strategy for denying climate change 
in the face of overwhelming evidence (ibid.; 
227). Such ‘agnotological projects’ deliberately 
amplify disagreement amongst scientists in 
order ‘to create a picture of complete dissensus’ 
(Sismondo 2017; 5). The attempt to restore to 
scientific objects ‘their aura, their crown, their 
web of associations’, by exploring how they are 
constructed, has weakened their claim to reality, 
when the point was to add to it (Latour 2004; 
236). This echoes Alan Sokal’s warnings that 
undiscriminating attacks on scientific rationali-
ty might prove popular with exactly the kinds of 
obscurantist ‘allies’ that relativists do not want 
(Sokal 1999; 191). At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, Steve Fuller attacks the dictionary def- 
inition of ‘post-truth’ as simply revealing ‘how 
those dominant in the epistemic power game 
want their opponents to be seen’ (Fuller 2016; 
2). A pejorative distinction between fact and 
belief is simply Plato’s old ‘double truth’ – one 
for the elites, to support their rule, and another 
for the masses, to justify their sub jection. For 
Fuller, ‘post-truth’ is the cost of epistemic de-
mocracy – once the instruments of knowledge 
production are available to all, ‘they will end up 
working for anyone who has access to them’ – 
just as Church control over revealed wisdom 
2 I would be wary of the term ‘belief ’ as implying naϊve credulity. Bruno Latour dismisses the idea 
that either modern scientists or initiates in spirit-worship traditions possess some simple belief in 
the unproblematically ‘autonomous’ status of either Gods or cell-cultures. If belief exists at all, ‘it 
is the most complex, sophisticated... reflective activity there is’ (Latour 2010; 42).
3 Sokal argues that Barnes and Bloor are claiming a privileged status for sociological explanations 
which they deny to scientific (and indeed magical or mythical) ones (Sokal 1999; 80). This is 
also Latour’s argument in his 2004 paper. We de-realise the objects we do not believe in but 
we lend an unexamined trustworthiness to those we do believe in – e.g. science and rationality 
(for the sceptics) or ideology and discourse (for the social constructionists) (Latour 2004; 237). 
However, Latour and Woolgar explicitly argued that their account of laboratory work was con-
structed in exactly the same way as facts are ‘inscribed’ in the laboratory (Latour and Woolgar 
1986; 257). So here at least, there is an explicit attempt to apply the symmetry principle sym-
metrically.
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was fatally destroyed by demotic versions of the 
Bible and mass printing (ibid.; 2).4
My intention in this paper is to revisit 
the question; what is the epistemological and 
ontological status of facts in science? In other 
words, what kind of a thing are scientific facts? 
Can they claim any kind of epistemological 
‘specialness’, or can they be accounted for 
exclusively with reference to social processes? 
Without anticipating my conclusions, I would 
suggest that a lot hinges on what we mean 
by ‘social’. The symmetry principle assumes 
that the ‘Social World’ consists of specifically 
sociological pro cesses – such as socialisation, 
social control, formal and informal sanctions, 
and tacit inter-group negotiations (Barnes and 
Bloor 1982; Pinch and Bijker 1984; Latour 
and Woolgar 1986). This raises a further ques-
tion – do these processes exhaust what can be 
meant by the ‘social world’? In order to address 
the status of ‘facts’ and ‘social construction’ in 
science, I propose to look carefully at arguments 
around ‘facts’, ‘artefacts’ and ‘natural objects’ 
put forward by the defenders and opponents 
of ‘constructionist’ approaches since the 1980s. 
However, I will also be tracing constructionism 
back to one of its sources – the French philos- 
ophy of science of the 1930s and 40s. This may 
provide us with some unexpected answers.
Facts and Artefacts
A ‘fact’ is commonly understood as ‘some 
objectively independent entity which […] can-
not be modified at will’ (Latour and Woolgar 
1986; 175).  ‘Artefacts’ are accidents of scientific 
activity – a result of error, experimental ‘noise’, 
poor science or wishful thinking. However, ‘fact’ 
has a dual meaning, with roots in the Latin 
verb facere – ‘to make’ (ibid.; 174–175). This 
suggests a hidden blurred distinction between 
‘artefacts’ and ‘facts’.5 Based on his observations 
at the Salk Institute, Latour discovered that 
there existed a continuum between facts and 
artefacts, rather than a neat, self-evident oppo-
sition (Latour and Woolgar 1986; 176). In the 
laboratory, facts are produced through a process 
of inscription; coding samples, reading statistical 
outputs, drafting lab reports, writing scientific 
papers. Laboratory equipment functions as a set 
of ‘inscription devices’; ‘any item of apparatus 
[…] which can transform a material substance 
into a figure or diagram’ (ibid.; 51). The cycle 
of writing scientific papers (‘literary inscription’) 
produces types of statements about the natural 
substances which the inscription process is tak- 
en to be revealing or discovering. Latour and 
Woolgar distinguished five types of statement; 
from ‘Type 5’ – an accepted fact needing no 
qualification, to ‘Type 1’ – pure speculation, 
4 Fuller’s argument can be taken as precisely suggesting that the attempt to exempt certain kinds of 
knowledge from the symmetry principle, or at least restrict certain kinds of people from making 
use of it, has now been ‘unmasked’ as an abuse of power – Latour (2004) makes a similar argu-
ment but draws different conclusions.
5 Latour, in his later work, makes a distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘things’ – focussing attention 
on the social, deliberative processes surrounding scientific objects, and on the Norse and Anglo-
Saxon etymology of ‘thing’ as an assembly, a gathering (Latour 2004; 233). Established ‘facts’ can 
return to the status of a thing – a focus for public deliberation – in cases of scientific/technological 
failure (such as the Challenger disaster).
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an artefact (ibid.; 75–79). A statement becomes 
accepted as a fact when qualifying modalities, 
(‘it is unknown why [...]’) can be removed from 
it. At this point of stabilisation, the statement 
becomes split, between the description itself 
and an independent scientific object with a life 
of its own, understood to have existed prior to 
its description (ibid.; 176). Here, all the con-
structive operations necessary to elicit the fact 
through inscription disappear (ibid.; 76). ‘Facts’ 
can revert to artefact status if modalities are suc- 
cessfully reattached to them, making the idea 
that they owe their status to an external reality 
which functions as an ontological guarantee 
difficult to sustain (ibid.; 179). 
Inscription is accompanied by ‘local tacit 
negotiations’ between scientists – facts are 
‘created and destroyed’ in brief conversational 
exchanges (ibid.; 154). Lab conversations 
mix technical and theoretical discussion with 
personal judgements about the reliability of 
other researchers and their motivations (ibid.; 
166). Crucially, they seem lacking in ‘objective’ 
statements which ‘escape the influence of nego-
tiation between participants’ (ibid.; 158). For 
example, judgements of whether to carry out a 
falsifying experiment and how much evidence 
would be required hinged on the relative status 
of the researchers in the conversation, and on 
competitive pressures from other groups of 
researchers. These tacit negotiations display 
‘interpretative flexibility’, as facts can be inter-
preted in more than one way, and nature does 
not ‘force the issue’ (Pinch and Bijker 1984; 
420). ‘Interpretative loopholes’ may be used 
to discredit a scientist’s interpretation of their 
own data in one controversy, but in another 
dispute, there may be less scrutiny of the same 
scientist’s data – because it is being deployed to 
shut down another scientist’s claims (ibid.; 426). 
An apparently ‘crucial experiment’, providing 
decisive falsification of a claim, is often deployed 
rhetorically to persuade scientists outside of the 
‘core-set’ – that is, those scientists most closely 
involved in the controversy. Such experiments 
may not be convincing to the ‘core-set’ itself, 
and may not actually falsify anything, as in the 
‘ether wind’ controversy (Lakatos and Feye-
rabend 1999; 47). There is a parallel between 
the rhetorical strategies of the ‘core-set’ and the 
role of advertising in the relationship between 
producers and consumers of new technology 
(Pinch and Bijker 1984; 430). According to 
these accounts, the processes of inscription, 
negotiation and interpretation, which transform 
artefacts into facts, concealing their constructed 
origin in the process, are social all the way down.
Natural Objects and Social Objects
Maurizio Ferraris has recently criticised La-
tour’s claim that the Egyptian Pharaoh Rameses 
II could not have died of tuberculosis – since 
the bacillus responsible for the disease was 
only discovered in 1882 – as resulting from a 
confusion between reality and our knowledge of 
it through conceptual schemes (Ferraris 2014; 
32). He argues that this confusion has its roots 
in Kant’s argument that ‘without intuition, con-
cepts are blind’ (ibid.; 24). The idea that con-
cepts are necessary to experience is inflated into 
the assumption that they therefore construct 
reality. Kantian schemata elevate mathematics 
from a scientific convention into the way our 
minds and senses work. Ontology is confused 
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with epistemology as we no longer ask what 
things are, but ‘how they should be known by 
us’ (ibid.; 26). This model of Physicist-as-judge 
accounts for the exorbitant power given to 
science in postmodernist accounts, which be- 
comes the only source of knowledge (ibid.; 43). 
Ferraris argues that ontology and epistemology, 
the world and what we can know about it, are 
distinct from one another because reality is un-
amendable – ‘it cannot be corrected or changed 
by the mere use of conceptual schemes’ (ibid.; 
34). Descartes famously observes that the senses 
can easily be deceived (Descartes 2010 [1641]; 
82). However, this supposed ‘deceit’ is actually 
surprise, which makes it possible to distinguish 
between reality and imagination. Seeing things 
we don’t want to see (or which do not exist) is 
only ‘illusion’ if the senses are treated as cogni-
tive tools, as scientific instruments – we should 
instead see them as a source of reality’s resistance 
to our conceptual schemes (Ferraris 2014; 39).
This resistance is afforded by a class of 
natural objects – which have the attributes of 
three-dimensionality, coherence and persis- 
tence. Faced with such objects, epistemology 
has only a reconstructive function – acknowl- 
edging something which exists independently 
of itself (ibid.; 59). The knowing subject can 
impose a ‘contingent unity’ upon these objects – 
Ferraris gives the examples of flocks, forests 
and heaps. However, it is the set of properties 
these objects have independently of us which 
allow us to classify them in this way. So, the 
agency exerted by subjects is not that of the 
classifying scientist (Ferraris 2013; 35). There 
are, however whole categories of objects which 
are socially constructed – these social objects do 
‘constitutively undergo the action of epistemol- 
ogy’ (Ferraris 2014; 53). Such objects imply 
inscribed acts, which must be intersubjective and 
recorded – this may involve memory traces, as 
opposed to physical recording. Such inscriptions 
are ‘decisive in the construction of social reality’ 
(ibid.; 56). Importantly, social objects rely upon 
social subjects genetically, but not structurally – 
for example, a contract depends on the parties 
drawing it up in order to exist, but once it is 
drawn up, they ‘depend on it for their existence 
as parties’ (Ferraris 2013; 43). The dependence 
of social objects on subjects does not make them 
subjective. Despite the fact that he has clearly 
established the reified character of social objects 
without any reference to nature, Ferraris goes 
on to argue that grasping the essence of social 
objects would be seriously difficult without 
the existence of natural objects ‘external to our 
perceptual schemes and resistant to their action’ 
(ibid.; 35).
As we have already seen, Ferraris distin-
guishes science from ordinary perception – our 
minds are not schemata and our eyes are not 
scientific instruments. Science is also distinct 
from perception because it is linguistic; ‘a sys-
tem of communication, inscription, coding, 
filing and patents’ (Ferraris 2014; 40). In 
contrast, everyday perception encounters reality 
rather than representing it (ibid.; 37). Ferraris’s 
conception of scientific objects as dependent 
upon inscription appears quite similar to 
Latour’s treatment of scientific facts and arte-
facts – both authors acknowledge the influence 
of Jacques Derrida (see Latour and Woolgar 
1986; 261). Ferraris however argues for a ‘weak 
textualism’, where ‘there is nothing outside the 
16
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text’ applies only to the social world, not the 
natural world (Ferraris 2014; 56). If scientific 
facts rely on ‘inscribed acts’, then they must 
be social objects, by Ferraris’s own definition. 
However, he also argues that ‘natural objects 
are independent of epistemology and make 
science true’ (ibid.; 63) [emphasis added]. It is 
not clear how science can be both in the so-
cial world (of the ‘text’), yet epistemologically 
guaranteed in some way by the natural world. 
Ferraris does not specify what the relationship 
is between unamendable nature and scientific 
objects as ‘inscribed acts’. As he argues for the 
resistance of the real to conceptual schemes 
and for the nature of scientific knowledge as (at 
least plausibly) ‘infinitely progressive’, it could 
be inferred that he is arguing for a progressive 
approximation of the social objects of science 
to the truth of nature (ibid.; 41). This is the 
argument made by Sokal (1999; 56). He also 
makes arguments about the coherence and 
persistence of sensation which are similar to 
Ferraris’s unamendability thesis. However, 
arguments based on progressive approximation 
fall foul of Thomas Kuhn’s arguments about 
paradigm change and incommensurability 
(Kuhn 1996 [1962]; 103).6 I will return 
to the issue of the discontinuous nature of 
scientific knowledge in the next section, as I 
explore the work of Gaston Bachelard – the 
originator of social constructionist accounts 
of scientific facts.
Bachelard: Second Culture 
and Second Nature
Although his extensive writings on science 
are little known in the ‘Anglosphere’, the philo-
sopher Gaston Bachelard is a major influence on 
constructionist approaches to science, through 
the work of Bruno Latour (Latour and Woolgar 
1986; 258; Latour 2010; 18). For Bachelard, 
there are no ‘facts’ in science in the ordinary 
sense of the term –  events or states of nature 
available for verification (constatation) by the 
senses. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s attempts to ‘un-
mask’ the workings of the igneous principle by 
observing burning paper were already comical 
by the standards of eighteenth-century chem- 
istry – an ‘empty phenomenology’ filled by 
dream imagery (Bachelard 1953; 219). Inspired 
by the work of Carl Gustav Jung, whilst draw-
ing very different conclusions, Bachelard dis-
cusses how the practical alchemists, faced with 
mysterious matter and uncertain experimental 
methods, drew on the unconscious for their 
theoretical concepts (ibid.; 39). Pre-scientific 
notions of the four ‘basic elements’ impeded the 
development of chemistry, until Joseph Priestley 
and Henry Cavendish demonstrated that water 
and air are not elements, by deploying concepts 
removed from sense-experience, the ‘invisible’ 
substances oxygen and hydrogen (ibid.; 74–75). 
All forms of knowledge are not ultimately 
reducible to sense perception – for example, 
6 Sokal quotes Maudlin to the effect that a paradigm cannot have such a strong effect on experi-
ence so as to guarantee that theory and experience always correspond, or there would never be a 
need to revise one’s theory (Sokal 1998; 70). However, this assumes that paradigms contain no 
anomalies, as it is precisely these which give rise, ultimately, to their collapse (Kuhn 1996 [1962]). 
Paradigms can wholly shape experience yet also be contradictory and thus unstable.
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the three ‘basic’ colours (red, green and blue) 
are only basic to the human eye, which has 
difficulty discriminating between ‘shades’ of 
colour, which tend to blur into the ‘primary’ 
ones. Using a prism, Isaac Newton demon-
strates the equal importance of all the colours 
of the spectrum – forming the basis for the later 
discovery of ultra-violet radiation, infra-red 
and x-rays (Bachelard 1949; 116). Discon-
nected observable facts only make sense when 
enmeshed in a network of reasons removed from 
sense-experience, hence Bachelard’s observation 
that ‘the moving Earth was an idea before it 
was a fact’ (ibid.; 123). As scientists work on 
intangible objects, using indirect methods, ex-
perience not mediated by theory is ‘mutilated’ 
(ibid.; 35). Rather than a ‘naϊve’ rationalism 
made up of basic principles grounded in sense-
experience, modern science can be understood 
as an ‘experimental rationalism’ (rationalisme 
appliqué).7 This involves a complex relation-
ship between ‘theoretical coherence’, and ‘ex-
perimental precision’, which serves to produce 
‘stable scientific objects’ (ibid.; 9). Observation 
is always ‘second order’ observation – resulting 
from successive movements between ever more 
precise experiments and ever finer theoretical 
concepts. Bachelard argues for an a posteriori 
dialectics, working on contingent, changeable 
notions, rather than starting from a priori fixed 
principles (Bachelard 1972; 8). This is ‘an ac-
count of empirically engaged reasoning, not 
of theoretical reasoning subsequently applied’ 
(Tiles 2012; 24).
Just as there are no ‘empirical data’, ex-
perimental rationalism has no ‘basic facts’, 
from which complex models would then be 
‘built up’. For example, René Descartes’s simple 
separation of figure from movement makes no 
sense at sub-atomic level (Bachelard 1934; 142). 
Scientific objects are not discrete fixed entities, 
but relationships – the ‘pyramidal’ structure of 
the carbon atom is not an inherent property, 
but a result of its ‘excitation’ by other atoms 
and a complex and slow development of theory 
in both classical and quantum chemistry was 
necessary before this was fully understood. For 
Bachelard, ‘it is the relationship which sheds 
light on being’ (1934; 148; Bachelard 1953; 
120). Bachelard explicitly refers to this eluci-
dation of structure through the relationships 
between particles and molecules – and the cor-
responding development of dense networks of 
theory and experimental data – as processes of 
construction. Bachelard uses the successive rein-
terpretations of the periodic table, interwoven 
with developments in physics and chemistry, 
as an exemplar of this construction process. 
Artificial means had to be employed to fill the 
‘gaps’ in Mendeleev’s table – irradiation and ra-
diation counters – producing substances which 
are not only invisible but ‘escape the category 
7 I have taken the liberty of avoiding strictly literal translations of Bachelard’s key terms – as Mary 
Tiles observes, ‘Applied Rationalism’ is a misleading translation of ‘Rationalisme Appliqué’ as it 
suggests a derivation of knowledge from first principles (Tiles 2012; 24). It also could be seen to 
imply some kind of technocratic ‘STEM’ vision of scientific knowledge. I think that ‘Experimen-
tal Rationalism’ better captures Bachelard’s argument – that both reason and the real are ‘in play’ 
and dialectically related in the scientific enterprise.
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of quantity’ (Bachelard 1953; 99). The science 
of matter is ‘a science which constructs its object’ 
(ibid.; 115) [emphasis added].
Phenomeno-technics (Phenomènotechnique) 
constructs the phenomena under study by 
means of rational, algebraic laws (Bachelard 
1949; 109).  ‘Raw nature’ does not reveal its 
essence to us, as the geological and physical 
events which shaped it are in the distant past. 
Earthquakes and volcanoes are only sporadic ex-
pressions of ‘the earth as a laboratory’ (Bachelard 
1953; 32). Unmediated nature constitutes an 
illegible ‘statistical disorder’, whilst ‘stylised na-
ture’ prepared using mathematical schemata is 
less opaque than that available to direct observa-
tion (Bachelard 1934; 170). The manufactured 
nature of the phenomena allows us to know 
their essence. Bachelard uses the example of wax 
prepared in the laboratory to precise specifica-
tions, to mark the differences between modern 
science and Cartesian rationalism. In giving 
up on the deceptive senses once the wax began 
to evaporate in the heat of the fire, Descartes 
failed to see that a dialectical unity of thought 
and experience could serve to reconstruct the 
phenomenon (ibid.; 172). The disappearance 
of unconscious imagery and ‘rêverie’ from sci-
entific thinking is a result of the scientific spirit 
educating itself through abandoning nature and 
turning to ‘matter artificially created through 
human action’ (Bachelard 1953; 50). Given 
the production of such ‘substances without ac-
cidents’, the philosopher can no longer project 
the irrational onto nature’s ‘unspeakable depths’ 
(ibid.; 81). 
The artificially produced phenomenon is 
always in a dialectical relationship with its nou-
menon, expressed algebraically – thought pro-
cesses are carried by mathematical expressions 
which are at the same time physically embodied 
in the laboratory (Bachelard 1934; 162; Tiles 
2012; 26). Bachelard observes that a hypothe-
sis is not a common-sense ‘assumption’, it is 
‘written right into the equipment’ (Bachelard 
1949; 134). With mass spectroscopy, the nou-
menon – theorems governing the trajectory of 
isotopes – drives the construction of the equip- 
ment, and ‘a long detour through theoretical 
science’ is required to understand the output, 
no longer in the form of simple data, but of 
experimental results (ibid.; 103). By contrast, 
the nineteenth-century chemist’s scales were 
grounded in common-sense understandings of 
equilibrium as an identity between two masses. 
Completing the dialectical movement, the 
constructed phenomena then serve to further 
develop the mathematically expressed noume-
na. Bachelard remarks that the filters used in 
radiophonic equipment not only correct ‘noise’ 
in the equipment itself, but also in the related 
sets of equations (ibid.; 159). Latour and Wool-
gar draw on Bachelard’s ‘phenomeno-technics’ 
to argue that we cannot construct an opposition 
between ‘material’ and ‘conceptual’ components 
of scientific activity:
when, for example, a member of the laboratory 
uses a computer console […] he mobilises the 
power of both electronics and statistics. When 
another member handles the NMR spectrome-
ter […] to check the purity of his compounds, 
he is using spin theory and the outcome of some 
twenty years of basic physics research. (Latour 
and Woolgar 1986; 66)
The apparatuses in the laboratory are the 
reified outcomes of long scientific controversies. 
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They are then themselves used to settle fresh 
controversies – the mass spectrometer, which 
Bachelard was already discussing in the 1940s, 
is the ultimate weapon in such disputes. As it 
is ‘the reified part of a whole field of physics’, it 
is almost impossible to challenge (Latour and 
Woolgar 1986; 242). Once a controversy is 
settled, the new substance or theorem which is 
its outcome can then be reified in turn, by being 
incorporated into the laboratory equipment. 
Thus, Latour and Woolgar argue, the inscription 
devices of the laboratory are reified theories – a 
direct translation of Bachelard’s théorie réalisée 
(ibid.; 66; Bachelard 1966; 26).
This ‘directed phenomenology’ at the heart 
of modern science is an inherently social and 
historical process. One could imagine a child 
genius re-inventing Euclidean geometry from 
scratch with toy blocks, but ‘one cannot ima g- 
ine a materialist genius remaking chemistry, 
far from any books, with rocks and powders’ 
(Bachelard 1953; 65). The complex processes 
involved in creating pure isolated substances in 
forms not found in nature implies a complex 
social infrastructure. The potential vicious 
circle, where the purity of a substance is only 
guaranteed by the purity of those substances 
making it up, with no independent measure 
of purity, is broken by the very social-historical 
nature of science. Every period in the develop-
ment of chemistry, for example, established 
a body of reagents at a set standard of purity, 
which each succeeding era surpasses. So, sci-
ence has a historical and ‘social guarantee’ of 
its progressive approximation to absolute purity 
(ibid.; 79). As with the constructed pheno mena, 
the ‘noumenal’ theoretical models are also de-
pendent upon the size and complexity of the 
social networks inherent in modern scientific 
activity. The ordering of the elements in the 
periodic table depended upon the sheer weight 
of experimental work which these networks 
permit (ibid.; 85). The corporate nature of sci-
ence as a ‘Guild’ (cité) drives the development 
of ‘experimental rationalism’ – as the dialectical 
movements between theory and experiment 
continuously accelerate and multiply as a result 
of the grouping together of ever larger numbers 
of ‘proof-workers’ (travailleurs de la preuve) 
(ibid.; 86). An isolated individual researcher 
would be unable to move beyond poorly formu-
lated ‘basic questions’ – whereas the collective 
scientific enterprise, driven by experimental 
rationalism, is constantly changing and refining 
its problematics. Becoming a scientist means 
situating oneself culturally, taking on rank and 
position within the ‘Guild of Scientists’ (cité 
scientifique). This has a profound transformative 
effect on individual consciousness. The lack of 
rigour of isolated, ‘gentleman amateur’ investi-
gations of nature leads to an understanding of 
the natural world as indefinite and mysterious, 
and ultimately unknowable (ibid.; 3). Scientific 
reasoning at the individual level is a product 
of social and cultural practices through which 
scientists are socialised into a second culture, 
implying a sharp break with ‘naϊve materialism’ 
(Tiles 2012). Whilst Bachelard is distinctive in 
‘insisting that any epistemology must include 
the role of the knower’, this reasoning subject 
is always a social subject (Tiles 2012; 25). The 
models and schemata produced by science at a 
given moment in its development have a func-
tion as ‘pedagogical values’ (Bachelard 1953; 
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121). This is close to Kuhn’s discussion of the 
way in which scientists are socialised into the 
dominant paradigm through learning how to 
solve specific problems or ‘puzzles’ (Kuhn 1996 
[1962]; 46–47).
At the core of Bachelard’s philosophy of 
science lie facts as complex constructs – both 
because the facts only make sense as a network 
of elements interwoven with theory, and, in a 
more literal sense, because theory grounded 
in experiment serves to produce facts – new 
experience and new thought are produced 
by ‘objective meditation […] in the labora-
tory’ (Bachelard 1934; 176). Both aspects of 
this process – ‘experimental rationalism’ and 
‘phenomeno-technics’ – depend on the fact that 
modern science functions as a ‘Guild’ (cité), in 
other words as a social body. So Bachelard is pre-
cisely talking about the social construction of facts 
in science, which represents a ‘second culture’ – 
to use Tiles’s expression – which has broken 
decisively with empiricism and self-evident 
‘facts of nature’.8 As experimental rationalism 
is a social process, so the nature upon which it 
works is a social product. Bachelard stresses that 
phenomeno-technics does not ‘extract’ dormant 
properties from nature – it transforms nature, 
and, by so doing, socialises it. Hydrogen and 
oxygen are ‘social gases, gases of high civilisa-
tion’ (Bachelard 1953; 31). The modern chemist 
does not approach the mineral order as a set of 
external facts to be investigated from scratch, as 
it reflects the traces of human historical scientific 
activity – it has a ‘human depth’ (ibid.; 22). 
Chemistry has projected a network of relations 
onto the mineral realm which do not exist in 
nature. The ‘second culture’ of modern experi-
mental science is reflected in a second nature, 
which it has produced. 
Bachelard suggests that human reason in 
a sense serves to complete the work of nature. 
Plants and other living organisms, as they 
evolved, reintroduced dynamic chemical pro-
cesses into an ‘inert’ earth, whose processes of 
geo-chemical formation had ceased. However, 
these pre-human phenomena are surpassed once 
human beings develop culture, and, ultimately, 
scientific activity. Bachelard is perhaps not 
entirely serious when he suggests that ‘nature, 
wishing to do chemistry, finally created the 
chemist’ – an echo of the ancient Hermetic 
idea that God created Man because ‘there had 
to be another being who could contemplate 
what God had made’ (ibid.; 33; Yates 1991; 
36). Given that the nature which the modern 
chemist or physicist is working with is precisely 
8  Bachelard also stresses the role of scientific polemic (an inherently social activity) in driving for-
ward the dialectics of theory and experiment – for example in the controversies over the valency 
of the carbon atom and the position of the transuranic elements in the periodic table (Bachelard 
1953).  Proof is ‘a truth which has survived a polemic’ (Bachelard 1949; 31). This position is 
echoed by Latour’s ‘Third Rule of Scientific Method’; ‘the settlement of a controversy is the cause 
of nature’s representation’ (Sokal 1998; 85; Latour and Woolgar 1986; 180 for a similar formula-
tion). Bachelard likewise stresses that facts are intertwined with an a posteriori dialectics – there 
are no ‘a priori’ facts of nature. There is also a close parallel between Lyotard’s agonistic/language 
game model of science as used by Latour and Woolgar (Lyotard 1979; Latour and Woolgar 1986), 
and Bachelard’s analysis of the role of ‘polemic’ in science (Bachelard 1949).
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a socialised nature, it might be possible to argue 
that rather than nature creating humans so that 
it could know itself, we have created a human-
ised nature – as it is the only nature which it 
is possible for us to know. Bachelard stresses 
repeatedly that direct contemplation of nature 
‘as it is’ is simply ‘empty phenomenology’. We 
can only know a nature which has taken a ‘long 
detour through the theoretical sciences’. Also, 
as we have seen, he rejects Descartes’s positing 
of simple basic entities which can be known 
directly, in favour of complex constructed 
facts (Bachelard 1934; 146). It was precisely 
against this Cartesian reasoning from basic 
entities that Giambattista Vico proposed the 
verum factum principle; ‘that full knowledge 
of any thing involves discovering how it came 
to be what it is as a product of human action’ 
(Costelloe 2016). Bachelard’s work is precisely 
about understanding this human action, in the 
form of experimental rationalism. Therefore, 
it is possible to argue that scientific facts are 
true (verum) because they are made (factum). 
Latour and Woolgar infamously argued that 
the correspondence between statements and the 
external entities to which they refer is because 
they are identical (Latour and Woolgar 1986; 
177). Bachelard’s experimental theories and 
theory-laden facts may not be identical, but 
they are both ‘abstract concrete’ moments of the 
same dialectical process (Tiles 2012).
Bachelard himself might object to this – pos-
sibly rather bold – interpretation, as he argues 
that science – after its break from the ‘rêveries’ of 
pre-science – never regresses. If science ‘changes 
its constitution’, it is because this change repre-
sents a demonstrable advance over earlier forms 
(Bachelard 1949; 31). This suggests a model of 
progressive ‘approximation to the truth’, as is 
also suggested by his account of the historical 
development of purification processes in chem-
istry, discussed above (Bachelard 1953; 79). 
He also suggests that theoretical schemata and 
empirical knowledge gradually ‘oscillate’ more 
and more closely together, towards a point of 
convergence (ibid.; 121). However, Bachelard 
explicitly attacks the notion that the develop-
ment of scientific understanding through edu-
cation should be ‘essentially cumulative’ – where 
one learns basic principles as an ‘inheritance’ 
and simply builds on them by refining existing 
taxonomies of natural objects and deducing 
the odd additional theorem (Bachelard 1972; 
10). Reason should not become ossified into 
a tradition.  As it is experiment-driven and 
dialectical, reason is constantly displaced; e.g. 
electricity no longer has the same meaning that 
it did in the 18th century (Bachelard 1949; 39). 
Even within modern chemistry, beneath the 
continuity of nomenclature, ‘there is radical 
variation in the concepts’ (Bachelard 1953; 6). 
Scientific materialism is constantly changing its 
own foundations, so that, paradoxically, it is the 
new which is the most basic. He criticises phi-
losophers who see a false continuity in science, 
by projecting its early slow development onto its 
later, more revolutionary phases. Scientific in-
novation points to discontinuity in knowledge 
(savoir) (ibid.; 211). Given such discontinuity, 
Bachelard could be taken to be implying incom-
mensurability between different moments in the 
development of science, in which scientists on 
either side of the dialectical shift are ‘in differ-
ent worlds […] see[ing] different things when 
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they look in from the same point in the same 
direction’ (Kuhn 1996 [1962]; 150). If this is in 
fact the case, then a progressive approximation 
to nature cannot be the result of the dynamic 
process of experimental rationalism, because 
there is no neutral standpoint from which to 
assess it. 
Conclusions
I will now attempt to draw out the implica-
tions of my argument about the ontological and 
epistemological status of scientific facts, which 
I have been developing throughout this paper. 
I will first briefly resume my discussion in the 
last section. Bachelard’s description of a so-
cialised nature constructed by scientific activity 
can only be taken to refer to an a priori ‘state 
of nature’ if we accept a model of science as a 
progressive process of approximation to the real. 
I have argued that this is difficult to sustain, 
given Bachelard’s understanding of scientific 
knowledge as discontinuous. The discontinu-
ity between paradigms was also my objection 
to Ferraris’s argument that scientific objects are 
social, yet somehow grounded in natural objects 
which ‘make them true’.9 If we abandon pro-
gressive approximation, we are left with a nature 
that is knowable because it is constructed – a 
‘second nature’ created by science’s ‘second cul-
ture’. In this case, it is literally true that ‘the facts 
are made up’ (Latour 2004; 230). However, 
this ‘made-up-ness’ cannot simply be reduced 
to local tacit negotiations between scientists, 
which is certainly how Latour’s early work can 
be interpreted, even though he was at pains to 
point out that it was not his intention to argue 
that scientific facts are not real (Latour and 
Woolgar 1986; 176). As Ferraris argues, the fact 
that something is a social object – i.e. a social 
construct – does not mean that it is structurally 
dependent on the social actors who constructed 
it. Actors can in fact become dependent on their 
own constructs. There is ‘a before and an after, 
namely a before and an after of the inscription of 
the act by which [social objects] are constituted’ 
(Ferraris 2013; 43). Latour, in one of his later 
works, discusses Louis Pasteur’s account of his 
own laboratory work, in which he asserts the 
reality of ‘his’ lactic acid because he ‘carefully set 
the stage on which the ferment revealed itself 
on its own’ (Latour 2010; 17). Pasteur concedes 
that his conclusions about the nature of the 
acid ‘go beyond the facts’, resting rather on 
criteria of methodological consistency, yet also 
argues that any rejection of the argument that 
fermentation is a living process has been contra-
dicted by the experiment. Thus, he moves back 
and forth between Realist and Constructionist 
‘repertoires’ (ibid.; 18). Latour goes on to argue 
that all human activity involves this ‘middle pas-
sage’ between subject and object, construction 
9  Further, Ferraris’s class of ‘natural objects’ relies on a theory of direct perception, which is itself 
difficult to sustain. Kuhn suggests that ‘something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception 
itself ’ (Kuhn 1996 [1962]; 113). If natural objects shape perception, this presupposes that they 
appear in the same way in every situation and can be neatly distinguished from one another – 
otherwise we are reliant on linguistic networks of meaning for perceptual judgements (Mulkay 
1979; 34).
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and autonomous existence ‘out there’. Pasteur’s 
actions are uniquely his own at that moment 
at which they slightly escape him, like those 
of Candomblé practitioners eliciting ancient 
deities through ritual. In both cases, it is ‘pre-
cisely because their actions have gone slightly be-
yond them’ that they are uniquely theirs (ibid.; 
41) [emphasis added]. This is the moment at 
which ‘before’ turns into after, and lactic acid 
and ancestral gods become real. As this compari-
son suggests, the facts of science do not have to 
become the model for all of reality – even if all 
of reality is constructed – although Ferraris’s 
observation that certain kinds of postmodernist 
thought did make such a conflation may well 
be accurate (Ferraris 2014; 43).
My argument so far suggests a peculiar 
ontological status for scientific objects – they 
do not rely on a ‘Natural World’ for their 
existence, but they escape from their creators 
and constitute a perfectly real objective world, 
which is structurally, but not genetically, inde-
pendent from them. Scientific facts are thus 
neither natural objects nor discourse effects. 
They are objectively real, yet ‘social all the way 
down’. As we saw in our discussion of Bach-
elard’s phenomeno-technics, scientific facts are 
both expressed through – and elicited from – 
the algebraic laws which are their noumena 
(Bachelard 1934; 162; Tiles 2012; 26). Thus, 
it is difficult to accept the idea that they are not 
‘epistemologically special’ – as this ultimately 
implies that sociologists, with their models of 
generational transmission, social control, and 
tacit negotiation, can know all there is to know 
about them. In dismissing the ‘epistemological 
specialness’ of science, Trevor J. Pinch and Wibe 
E. Bijker argue that science can be studied in 
the same way as, e.g. ‘primitive’ mythology 
(1984; 401). At first sight, this argument might 
appear as a welcome move against Eurocentric 
accounts of post-Cartesian science. However, 
if all knowledge claims can be assessed in terms 
of categories derived from Euro-American 
sociology, such as ‘socialisation’ (Barnes and 
Bloor 1982), then this is not a ‘relativistic’ or 
a ‘post-colonial’ approach, but a positivistic 
one – despite the claims of ‘epistemological 
relativism’. This type of account relies on reduc-
ing the objects under study (but never its own 
sociological categories) to what Latour terms 
‘fairy objects’ (Latour 2004). In anthropologi-
cal terms, this is an etic position – one which 
makes generalised statements classifying data 
into a single system, based on situationally 
transcendent criteria. This is contrasted with 
an emic (or ‘insider’) perspective, which de-
scribes ‘the pattern of [a] particular language 
or culture in reference to the way in which the 
various elements of that culture are related to 
each other in the functioning of that particular 
pattern’ (Jardine 2004; 264). Some anthropolo-
gists reject etic approaches altogether, whilst 
others combine emic and etic perspectives 
(ibid.; 265–266). Such a combined – or indeed 
dialectical – approach would be the one most 
congruent with my argument in this paper. 
Etic sociological accounts may be necessary to 
explaining science, but they are not sufficient. 
Bachelard does argue that individual scientists 
need to be socialised into scientific culture, 
but he does not reduce experimental rational-
ism to a set of social norms (Bachelard 1953; 
Tiles 2012).
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If my overall argument about the nature of 
scientific facts is a valid one, this would suggest 
that Sergio Sismondo is right in his wariness 
about Steve Fuller’s claim that the ‘post-fact’ era 
is simply the inevitable cost of the ‘democratisa-
tion’ of constructionism. As he argues, the fact 
that ‘it could be otherwise’ does not equate to 
saying that ‘it could easily be otherwise’ (Sis-
mondo 2017; 3). Echoing Bachelard, Sismondo 
points out that infrastructure, effort and valida-
tion structures are required in the construc-
tion of knowledge. Bachelard does stress that 
science can – and often does – change its own 
foundations (Bachelard 1953). But this cannot 
be equated with ‘simply blowing up existing 
structures of knowledge’, which, as Sismondo 
suggests, is likely to have anything but demo-
cratic consequences (Sismondo 2017; 4). Whilst 
I have argued against Ferraris’s insistence that we 
must retain a category of natural objects in order 
to avoid ‘nihilistic outcomes’, I would agree that 
careless formulations of constructionism run the 
risk of asserting that ‘the reason of the strongest 
is always the best’ (Ferraris 2014; 72). 
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SANTRAUKA
ANTRINĖ KULTŪRA IR ANTRINĖ GAMTA: FAKTAI, pOSTFAKTAI  
IR SOCIALINIS MOKSLINIŲ OBJEKTŲ KONSTRAVIMAS
Politinėse ir visuomeninėse diskusijose „9–11“ konspiracijos teorijos šalininkai ar neigiantieji klima-
to kaitą dažnai imasi konstruktyvizmo, kurį naudoja kaip „post-faktus“ pagrindžiantį argumentą. Mokslo 
studijose konstruktyvizmas irgi sukėlė nemenką sumaištį, todėl šiame straipsnyje noriu naujai pažvelgti į 
tai, ką apie mokslo faktus kalbėjo patys šios intelektualinės tradicijos atstovai. Remdamasis Gastono Bache-
lardo įžvalgomis, labai svarbiomis mokslinio konstruktyvizmo sampratai, bandau įrodyti, kad mokslas gali 
prasiskverbti į tiriamų reiškinių „noumeno esmę“ todėl, kad jis juos konstruoja. Tačiau tai nereiškia, kad 
moksliniai faktai gali tapti viskuo, kuo tik mes įsigeistume, kad jie būtų. 
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